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Formation of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Position on 
the “Northern Territories” Issue:  
Inter-Party Rivalry as a Bone of Contention
Yakov Zinberg＊
The Japanese Government’s recognition of the Russian Federation’s （RF） legal succes-
sion on all the agreements and accords between the former Soviet Union and Japan means 
that both countries have yet to conclude a peace treaty. The Joint Declaration signed by 
Japan and the former Soviet Union on 19 October 1956, while specifying in Clause 1 that 
“the state of war between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall cease on 
the date on which this declaration enters into force” and in Clause 2 that “diplomatic and 
consular relations” between both countries “shall be restored,” stipulates in Clause 9 that 
“Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to continue, after the restoration 
of normal diplomatic relations” between them, “negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace 
Treaty.”1
However, the treaty has not been signed yet. The bilateral territorial dispute in question 
relates primarily to the issue of sovereignty of the islands of Kunashir （‘Kunashiri’ in Jap-
anese）， Iturup （Etorofu）， Shikotan （Shikotan）， Habomai or ‘Ploskie’ Habomais） which 
had been recognized as disputed in April 1991 during the then President of the former So-
viet Union Mikhail Gorbachev’s official visit to Japan.2
Japan as the claimant refers to the San Francisco Peace Treaty （SFPT）， signed in 
1951, as the legal basis of its demands. Article 2 Section （c） of the SFPT is of high impor-
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tance, stipulating as it is that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile 
Islands.”3 Being the only relevant reference to the “Kurile Islands” in the text of the 
SFPT as a whole, it lacks clarity as regards the scope of islands mentioned. Nor does it 
make clear whether or not the “Kuril Islands” had to be ceded necessarily in favor of the 
Soviet Union.4 
In Russia the currently disputed islands, along with their numerous adjacent and adjoin-
ing islets, are regarded as belonging to the “Kurile Islands“ chain which is in turn divided 
into the “Greater Kurile” chain, bordering the Kamchatka Peninsula in the north, and the 
“Lesser Kurile” chain, bordering Japan’s northernmost island of Hokkaido in the south. Ac-
cording to Russian official sources, the disputed islands of Iturup （“Etorofu” in Japanese） 
covering 6,725 sq. Km and Kunashir （Kunashiri） covering 1,550 sq.km belong to the 
“Greater Kuriles” chain’s southern edge, while the disputed islands of Sikotan （Shikotan）， 
covering 182 sq. km, and the “Ploskie Islands” （frequently bearing no collective name at 
all or referred to as “Habomai,” echoing their Japanese name） group covering about 80 
sq.km make up the “Lesser Kurile” chain, with the “Kurile Islands” as a whole covering 
about 15,600 sq.km of land mass.5 In terms of administrative division, Kunashir and all the 
islands of the Lesser Kurile chain form the “Southern Kuriles Region” of the RF Sakhalin 
Region, while Iturup belongs to the Sakhalin Region’s “Kuriles Region” incorporating as 
well the islands of Urup and Simushir.6 
In Japan, until early 1960’s it was common to regard the whole range of islands stretch-
ing from Hokkaido to the Kamchatka Peninsula, in some instances excluding either Shiko-
tan or the Habomais, or both, as the “Chishimas.” The term “Chishimas” might in effect 
be viewed as identical to that of the “Kurile Islands”， which nevertheless served to give 
rise to as yet another contention rooted in the fact that the “Kurile Islands” term applied 
in the SFPT text appeared in the Japanese language version of the treaty as the “Chishi-
ma Islands.” Typically, the Military Government Handbook entitled Kurile Islands and 
marked as OPNAV 50E-2, issued by the U.S. Navy Department on 1 November, 1943 and 
3　See the text in English at Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs （MOFA） official cite. 
Retrieved 10 August, 2018 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/
edition92/period4.html
4　See Price, Glen W. “Legal Analysis of the Kurile Islands Dispute”．7 Temp. Int’l & Comp. 
L.G. 395, 1993, pp.395-420.
5　See Georgiev. Ostrova, p.23.
6　Ibid.
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introduced by F.J. Horne, then serving as Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Vice Chief of Naval 
Operations, referred to the “Kurile Islands” as “known to the Japanese as Chishima 
（Thousand Islands）” and designated the currently disputed islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri 
and Shikotan as the “Southern Kuriles”．7
 
Following accepted practice, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs （MOFA） Public Infor-
mation Bureau stipulated in the brochure issued in 1955 and entitled The Northern Is-
lands. Background of Territorial Problems in the Japanese-Soviet Negotiations that the 
“Kuriles” were “a chain of thirty-odd small islands which hang out like a garland from 
Hokkaido, one of the four principal islands of Japan, to Kamchatka Peninsula of the U.S.S.R. 
over a distance of 750 miles （1,200 kilometers）．”8 However, the MOFA’s annual publica-
tion entitled Japan’s Northern Territories issued in 1991 stated referring to “the important 
treaties concluded between the two countries in the past” that the “Northern Territo-
ries”， a term routinely applied to the disputed islands, were not included in the “Kurile Is-
lands” renounced in accordance with the SFPT provisions.9 
In October 1961 the LDP government resolved to publicize its official Position Statement 
regarding the ‘Northern Territories’　problem. Issued on 6 October 1961, it is this very 
statement of the LDP's views on this subject which is widely regarded as representing the 
Japanese government's official stance. The statement is based on the reply which was giv-
en by the then Japanese Foreign Minister, Kosaka Zentaro, to a query regarding the 
'Northern Territories' problem put by the LDP deputy, Yukatsugu Tokuji, during delibera-
tions in the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee.10
Referring to the 1855 and 1875 bilateral agreements, Japan’s government emphasized 
that Kunashiri and Etorofu were a part of Japan’s “immemorial territories” whose status 
differed substantially from that of the islands lying to the north of Uruppu inclusive. Typi-
cally, the government’s position avoided any references to the terms “Southern Chishi-
mas” or “Northern Chishimas”， abstaining, however, from identifying Kunashiri and Eto-
rofu as not a part of the Kurile Islands chain.11 
7　See Kurile Islands, p.6.
8　See The Northern Islands, p.9.
9　See Japan’s Northern Territories, p.12.
10　Nihon Keizai Shinbun daily newspaper. 18 October, 1961.
11　Hoppo Ryodo Mondai Shiryou Shu. 1972. Tokyo: Northern Territories Problem Association, p.239.
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Testifying to the confusion as it applied to basic terms, only two days before the govern-
ment’ s position was announced, on 4 October the Japanese Foreign Ministry had issued 
its Position Statement regarding the “Northern Territories” which, by contrast with that 
of the government, applied the term “Southern Chishimas” several times.12
Besides, the LDP government’s Position Statement referred to a statement which was 
made by the then Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, in the course of the bi-
lateral normalization talks on 1 August 1956. The LDP government’s document claimed 
that the government intended to support a stance brought forward by Shigemitsu.13 
In his statement of 1 August, 1956 Shigemitsu, according to a brief summary offered by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, admitted that Japan had renounced the Southern Sakhalin 
and the “Chishima Islands” in favor of the Allied Powers as in accordance with provisions 
of the SFPT.14 However, Shigemitsu at the same time stressed that Kunashiri and Etorofu 
were Japan’s “immemorial territories” implying that they had been uninterruptedly con-
trolled solely by Japan. He also indicated that Kunashiri and Etorofu were not a part of 
the “Chishima Islands” which Japan had renounced.15
Before proceeding to present the LDP’s position as it was expressed in the “Position 
Statement Regarding the Northern Territories Problem” of October 17, 1961, it is worth-
while mentioning the LDP government’s ordinance issued in March 1959.
On 15 May 1958, under revised legislation on the establishment of the Prime Minister’s 
Office, the Special Areas Liaison Bureau was set up as one of Internal Departments of the 
Prime Minister’s Office. It was entrusted with handling affairs pertinent to both the 
‘Southern Areas’ and the ‘Northern Areas.’ The definition of the ‘Northern Areas’ was 
issued on 20 March 1959 as following the Government Ordinance No. 33. According to the 
ordinance, the ‘Northern Areas ‘ included the Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, Etorofu and 





16　For the original text see Hoppo Ryodo Henkan Undo Gojyunen Shi . 1996. Tokyo: The 
Northern Territories Policy Association, p.65.
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The LDP’s Position Statement contained seven sections. The first position concerned the 
Habomais and Shikotan. According to the document, these islands both geographically and 
administratively were a part of Hokkaido and consequently a part of Japan proper, and 
were not included in the “Chishima Islands” which Japan had renounced in the San Fran-
cisco Peace Treaty （SEPT）．17 In order to support this claim, the LDP referred to a 
speech of the U.S. Ambassador Plenipotentiary at the San Francisco Peace Conference, 
John P. Dulles, which allegedly contained a similar position. However, Dulles mentioned 
only the Habomais in his speech as of 5 September 1951. He said as follows:
Some questions may be raised as to whether the geographical name “Kurile Islands” 
mentioned in Article 2 （C） includes the Habomai Islands. It is the view of the United 
States that it does not. If, however, there were a dispute about this, it could be referred to 
the International Court of Justice under article 22 ［of the SEPT）．”18
Besides, in this regard the LDP Position Statement refers as well to the Soviet Union’s 
promise to “transfer” the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan expressed in the Joint Declara-
tion of October 1956, and concluded that the Soviet Union was obligated to act so at the 
time of the conclusion of a peace treaty.19
The second position of the document is devoted to the issue of the status of Kunashiri 
and Etorofu. They are defined, firstly, as Japan’s “immemorial territories” in a sense that 
these islands “had never been placed under the sovereignty of any other country but Ja-
pan” and that besides the Japanese no other people had resided there. It was also asserted 
that according to the bilateral agreements of 1855 and 1875 the term “Kurile Islands” im-
plied the islands located to the north of Uruppu inclusive and hence did not relate to Ku-
nashiri and Etorofu.20
Also, the document referred to the ‘territorial non-aggrandizement’ principle, put for-
ward by the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration, as testifying to the fact that 
17　See full text of the Position Statement in Seisaku Geppo monthly. Tokyo: LDP Publ., pp.28-
30.
18　Jain, R.K. Japan’s Postwar Peace Settlements. 1978. New Delhi: Radiant Publ., p.186. See 
also Rees, David. The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles. 1985. Praeger, p.114.
19　Seisaku Geppo, p.28.
20　Ibid., p.29.
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the Soviet Union had no sovereign rights to annex these islands.21 In support of this claim 
the document, in particular, mentioned the Aide-Memoire of the U.S. Government as of 7 
September 1956, addressed to the Japanese government, which stipulated as follows :
The United States has reached a conclusion after careful examination of the historical 
facts that the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri （along with the Habomai Islands and Shiko-
tan which are a part of Hokkaido） have always been part of Japan proper and should in 
justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty. The United States would regard 
Soviet agreement to this effect as a positive contribution to the reduction of tension in the 
Far East.22 
The LDP Position Statement did not mention, however, that the United States did not 
specify its stance regarding the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu concerning the “Kurile 
Islands” stretch as a whole. Indeed, the absence in the Aide-Memoire of any comments 
concerning the relationship of Kunashiri and Etorofu to the term “Kurile Islands” may 
only be assessed as a severe deficiency, particularly in legal terms.
The document’s second part contained a concluding section stipulating that the Soviet 
Union was “occupying” the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu illegally and had to “return” 
them to Japan.23
The document’s third position relates to the islands located to the north of Uruppu in-
clusive and the Southern Sakhalin. Calling the former the “Chishima Islands,” thus in ef-
fect identifying the “Chishimas” as the “Kuriles,” the LDP admits that Japan had re-
nounced both areas in the “SFPT based on provisions of the Potsdam Declaration.”24 
However, the document proceeds to declare that both areas were renounced exclusively 
in favor of the signatories of the SFPT.
While also noting that the national status of these areas remained unresolved and had to 
be determined in the future by concerned powers, implying the SFPT signatories, the doc-
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SEPT, had no right to refer to the peace treaty in support of its possession of the “Chishi-
mas” and the Southern Sakhalin.25
The fourth position of the document briefly treated, in particular, issues of the Yalta 
Agreement and the Soviet Union’s refusal to admit the existence of the bilateral territorial 
dispute. Defining the Yalta Agreement as a “secret agreement” to which the Soviet Union 
referred in support of its territorial claims “to our country’s Northern Territories,” the 
LDP declared that it was not binding as far as Japan was concerned because Japan had 
neither participated in it nor ever accepted its provisions.26 Referring to the Soviet Union’s 
position of refusing to admit the existence of the territorial dispute per se, the LDP char-
acterized it as a “wild argument.”27
The document’s fifth position directly attacked a position assumed by the JSP regarding 
the territorial issue. Specifically, the document refuted the JSP’s approach which stipulated 
that “return” of the ‘Chishimas’ had to be secured after the signing of a peace treaty in 
the subsequent process of striving for the abolition of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty.28 
The LDP stated that there was nothing in common between the US-Japan Security Trea-
ty, which served to defend Japan, and the ‘Northern Territories ‘ issue and that both is-
sues could not be “mixed.”29
Moreover, the document declared that since, from a perspective of the content of previ-
ous bilateral negotiations, the bilateral territorial issues with the Soviet Union were ex-
pected to be eventually resolved by a peace treaty, the JSP’s offer to conclude a peace 
treaty on the basis of securing the “return” of only the Habomais and Shikotan implied 
“getting into the Soviet Union’s jar and forever losing any hopes to get the ‘Northern Ter-
ritories’ back.”30
Concluding this section of the statement, the LDP proceeded to accuse the JSP of “sid-
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U.S.-Japan Security Treaty through mixing it with the issue of “our country’s ‘Northern 
Territories.’” The LDP expressed its resolute protest against such a policy line.31
The sixth position of the statement declared that the LDP ‘ s consistent policy line was 
filled with a sincere desire to conclude a peace treaty as soon as the Soviet Union agreed 
to meet demands for the “return” of “our country’s ‘Northern Territories’.”32 
Besides, the LDP pledged to stubbornly assert Japan’s “vested” rights to possess the 
“Northern Territories,” relying on public support, and to persist in pursuing the goal of 
their “return.”33 The LDP also expressed a desire to promote in the meantime friendly, 
cooperative and peaceful relations with the Soviet Union, pledging compliance as regarded 
provisions of the bilateral Joint Declaration of October 1956 and adherence to the princi-
ples of non-interference into domestic affairs of other countries.34
The seventh, and the last, position of the LDP declared that even though Okinawa and 
the Ogasawaras （Bonin） were administered by the United States, their status fundamen-
tally differed from that of the “Northern Territories” because the United States had rec-
ognized Japan’s “residual sovereignty” over Okinawa and the Ogasawaras.35 The docu-
ment also indicated that the “return of administrative rights” over Okinawa and the 
Ogasawaras at the earliest opportunity was eagerly expected.36
The LDP’s position reflected peculiarities of the contemporary international environ-
ment, featuring the growing tension between the Soviet Union and the U.S. in particular in 
reference to the January 1960 revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which had been 
initially concluded simultaneously with the signing of the SFPT in 1951. On 27 January, 
1960 the Soviet government proceeded to issue a document widely known as “Gromyko 
Memorandum” that stipulated that “the Soviet Union cannot allow itself to contribute to 
an extension of the territory used by foreign armed forces by handing” the Habomais and 
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Declaration signed in 1956.37 This declaration in effect restored diplomatic relations be-
tween the two countries. At the same time the “Gromyko Memorandum” positively prom-
ised to turn the Habomais and Shikotan over to Japan “on condition of the withdrawal of 
all foreign troops from the territory of Japan and the conclusion of a peace treaty between 
the U.S.S.R. and Japan”， with only the latter condition having been specified in the 1956 
Joint Declaration.38
 
Replying to this memorandum on the same day, the LDP government made it clear that 
it was “unable to recognize the Soviet position in attaching a new condition to the terms 
of the Joint Declaration concerning the territorial problem”， simultaneously proclaiming 
that “it shall continue to ask for the return of not only Habomais and Shikotan islands but 
other territories which inherently belong to Japan.”39 On 24 February 1960, the Soviet 
Union proceeded to send yet another memorandum addressed to the Japanese govern-
ment, declaring that Japan’s claims “for the recovery of other territories as well” could 
only be regarded as “an expression of dangerous revenge-seeking tendencies.”40
Also, it is compelling to note that the LDP’s position concerning the “Northern Territo-
ries” issue was to a large extent brought forward as a response to opposing claims of the 
other political parties. In the preamble to the Position Statement as of 17 October 1961, 
the LDP made it clear that its issuance vas necessitated by an appearance of action pro-
grams generated by, in particular, the JSP.41 The LDP’s document starts with a blistering 
attack against the JSP, the LDP’s major political rival. The JSP’s proposed method for re-
solving the territorial dispute was assessed as “impossible to realize” and leading to re-
nouncing of Kunashiri and Etorofu.42
Formation of the Japan Socialist Party’s Position on the “Northern Territories” Issue
The very first Japan Socialist Party （JSP） document to have reviewed the “Northern 
Territories” problem was issued on 18 September 1950, when post-war peace treaties 
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ty.43 The document made it clear that at that point the JSP, while considering the Habo-
mais and Shikotan to be separate from the “Chishima Islands”， viewed both island groups 
as “minor islands” indicated in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration and recognized the 
right of the Allied Powers to dispose of them as found appropriate.44
However, in the latter regard, the document demanded that the Allied Powers’ final de-
cision should be based on a high regard for the principles of the Atlantic Charter of 1941. 
The document specifically mentioned the following two principles of the Atlantic Charter: 
（1） that the Allies would seek no territorial aggrandizement and （2） that they desire to 
see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peo-
ple concerned.45
Deserving further critical attention is the document issued on October 2, 1951 and entitled 
“Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee on Merits and Demerits ［賛否］ of the Peace 
Treaty and the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty."46 The Committee Chairman, Wada Hiroo de-
livered the report. Issued after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty （SFPT） but 
before its ratification by the Japanese Diet, this document reviewed various representative 
positions that had been expressed by the JSP’s Foreign Affairs Committee members.
Wada Hiroo noted that expert opinions on the subject differed. Thus, speaking of the es-
timates regarding a relationship between the international situation and the Peace Treaty, 
Wada indicated that views of Katsumata Seiichi and Sone Eki, two of the Committee’s 
members, were opposed to one another. Specifically, Sone while admitting that the Third 
World War was not inevitable, at the same time believed that an offensive against peace 
by the “international communist camp” did spread a high risk. Sone also claimed that 
even though the “international communist camp” showed distaste for provisions of the 
SFPT, it did not imply that developments in Korea had to lead to an all-out war involving 
43　［講和条約の内容に対するわが党の要望］ See Nihon Shakaito Yonjyunen Shi ［Fourty Years 
of the JSP Hitory］, Collection of Primary Sources. JSP Publ., Tokyo, 1987, p.224. 
44　The Potsdam Declaration stipulated in Article 8 that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration 
shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, 
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.” Jain, R.K. 1978. Japan’s 
Postwar Peace Settlements. New Dehli: Radiant Publishers, p.148.
45　See Berton, Peter. 1992. The Japanese-Russian Territorial Dilemma: Historical Background, 
Disputes, Issues, Questions, Solution Scenarios. Boston: Harvard University Publ., pp.32-33.
46　See Nihon Shakaito, pp.238-242.
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Japan’s participation.47
On his part, Katsumata, claiming that the Third World War was not inevitable, never-
theless warned that a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. was gaining 
momentum and in particular that the situation in Asia, primarily as it revolved around the 
“Korean issue,” was growing strained. Moreover, in contrast to Sone’s estimate, Katsuma-
ta claimed that in case the United States and Japan proceeded to conclude a separate 
peace treaty along with a mutual defense treaty, with both of them seeing China and the 
Soviet Union as “potential enemy states”， the confrontation between the Soviet Union and 
the U.S.A. would intensify and various conflicts in Asia centering on developments in Ko-
rea would become more difficult to resolve. Adding that since it was “obvious” that ac-
cording to both treaties Japan was obligated to interfere with “these and other ［similar］ 
conflicts,” Katsumata asserted that in the event of the Third World War Japan’s involve-
ment was “unavoidable.”48
Nevertheless, according to Wada’s report, all the Committee members demonstrated 
dissatisfaction with provisions which pertained to territorial issues.49 Firstly, as the report 
indicated, Committee members claimed reversion of Japan’s territorial rights to the South-
ern Sakhalin and the “Chishima Archipelago,” stressing specifically that the Yalta Agree-
ment’s provisions were not binding on Japan. Secondly, it was declared that the Habomais 
and Shikotan were “undoubtedly” Japan’s territories and that in case the Soviet Union re-
fused to “return” them to Japan, the matter would be brought forward to the Internation-
al Court in anticipation of a fair settlement.
Thirdly, implying provisions of Article 3 of the SFPT, Committee members expressed 
their protests against placing under the United Nation Organization’s trusteeship system, 
with the United States as a sole administrative authority, the Nansei Shoto （including the 
Ryukyu Islands and the Dai to islands）， the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan （including the 
Bonin Islands, Rosario Islands, the Volcano Islands, the Parece Vela and Marcus Islands）， 
and claimed reversion of Japan’s sovereign rights to these territories.50




50　Ibid. see full text of the SFPT in Jain, R.K. Japan’s Postwar Peace Settlements, pp.194-210.
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and geographical nature, in defense of their territorial claims “all the Committee members
—had unanimously demanded the application of ‘non-annexation’ and ‘non-aggrandize-
ment’ principles stipulated in the Atlantic Charter of 1942”．51
The very first JSP’s official document which put forward a linkage between the ‘North-
ern Territories’ issue and the U.S. military presence in Japan was entitled the “General 
Principles of the Political Course” and adopted at the JSP Unification Congress which took 
place on 13 October 1955. One of the JSP’s major political documents, it stipulated a de-
mand for the “return” of “the Habomais, Shikotan, Chishimas, Southern Sakhalin” as 
linked with the U.S. presence on Okinawa and the Ogasawaras （Bonin）．52
At the same time, it appealed for the conclusion of a “simple peace treaty” between Ja-
pan and the U.S.S.R., declaring the end of the war and the need for a restoration of diplo-
matic relations. Moreover, as an emergency measure in case the bilateral negotiations re-
garding a peace treaty were delayed, it suggested first of all to conclude a bilateral 
“provisional agreement” stipulating the end of the war and proposing to continue negotia-
tions regarding a conclusion of the peace treaty as well as a resolution of “various other 
pending problems.”53
The position expressed in the “General Principles of the Political Course” was further 
elucidated in the document issued on 2 February 1956 and entitled “The Political Course 
regarding Restoration of the Japanese-Soviet Diplomatic Relations.”54 This document was 
issued in the midst of the bilateral negotiating process which led to the signing of the So-
viet-Japanese Joint Declaration in October 1956.
Containing two parts, devoted to “basic political course” and a “concrete political 
course”， respectively, the document stipulated in the first part that the JSP planned to 
conduct foreign policy on the basis of “autonomous independence” in relation to either a 
“free camp” or a “communist camp” by means of establishing friendship and goodwill re-
51　Ibid., pp.239-240.
52　Ibid., p.322.
53　Ibid. According to Uezumi Mitsuhiro, formerly one of the JSP top level executives, this 
position had been so “realistic” that it later allowed the JSP International Department leaders 
to establish direct contacts “with the Soviet Union.” See Uezumi, Mitsuhiro. 1992. Nihon 
Shakaito Kobo Shi ［History of the Rise and Fall of the JSP］ Tokyo: Jiyusha, p.186.
54　日ソ国交回復に関する方針 See Nihon Shakaito, pp.329-330. 
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lations with all the countries of the world and representing a fully independent Japan. As 
it applied to the Soviet-Japanese relations, the document referred to the part mentioned 
above of the “General Principles of the Political Course” as the party’s “basic policy line.”55
The document specified a “concrete political course” regarding territorial issues in two 
sections of its second part, dealing with a proposed content of a peace treaty and a “provi-
sional agreement,” respectively.56
Addressing the issue of the status of the Habomais and Shikotan separately, the docu-
ment asserted that these islands initially represented a “part of Hokkaido” and accounted 
for the Soviet Union’s de facto occupation by referring to the Soviet Union’s “accidental 
military presence” on these islands at the end of the war. Concluding that consequently 
provisions of Article 2 of the SFPT according to which Japan “had renounced its rights to 
the Southern Sakhalin and the Chishima Islands” had nothing to do with the Habomais 
and Shikotan, the document advised that it was “natural” to claim the “reversion of this 
area to Japan” in the course of “forthcoming negotiations”．57
Turning attention to the Southern Sakhalin and the “Chishima Islands,” the document 
stipulated that the JSP was appealing to resolve the issue of their “reversion” in connec-
tion with the issue of the status of Okinawa and the Ogasawaras and through conducting 
either “separate” or “joint” negotiations.58 The latter provision implies conducting either 
“separate” negotiations with the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., respectively, or “joint” nego-
tiations between Japan, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.A. at once.59
Pointing out that this territorial claims was raised in violation of the SFPT’s Article 2, 
the document emphasized “fairness” of the JSP’s stance by referring, firstly, to the fact 
that Japan “had nothing to do with the Yalta Agreement” and, secondly, to essential fea-
tures of the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration （implying the ‘territorial non-ag-
grandizement’ principle） as well as “historical background” and “ethnic feelings”．60 Be-
55　Ibid., p.329.




59　See Uezumi, Nihon Shakaito, p.186.
60　See Nihon Shakaito Yonjyunen, p.329.
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sides, it was stipulated that if in relation to the peace treaty there were any territorial 
areas which could not be positively defined as due to “return,” a reference to their future 
status as a pending issue had to be recorded in the text of a peace treaty.61
The section dealing with a “provisional agreement” might be regarded as being of par-
ticular importance because it looked forward to the “return” of the Habomais and Shiko-
tan as a prerequisite for the conclusion of an agreement leading to the signing of a peace 
treaty expected to resolve the territorial issue. This particular vision had remarkably an-
ticipated a concept formulated in the bilateral Joint Declaration of October 1956 which of-
fered “transfer” of the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan as a route towards the conclusion 
of a further significant agreement.
The JSP viewed the signing of a “provisional agreement” exclusively as a practical mea-
sure provoked by two factors: firstly, a high probability of a rupture of a negotiating pro-
cess conducted on the basis of past evidence and, secondly, a search for a compromise in 
order not to “lose a perspective” of restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations, “no matter 
how fair our party’s demands in regard to these problems ［territorial issues］ are.”62
In addition, appealing to a common sense, the document warned that since the Soviet 
Union based its territorial claims on the Yalta Agreement’s provisions and sustained its 
territorial rights to the Southern Sakhalin and the “Chishima Islands” by referring to pro-
visions of the SFPT, neither the U.S. nor Great Britain could be expected to “flatly refute” 
the Soviet Union’s official stance.63 Extending the linkage still further, the document’s au-
thors indicated that as long as the de facto “dominance” over the Ogasawaras and Okina-
wa by the U.S. continued, it was difficult to persuade the Soviet Union to end its territorial 
control.64
Hypothesizing about the “worst scenario”， the JSP document’s authors suggested to 
conclude, “because of the lack of an alternative”， a “provisional agreement” that stipulat-
ed an end of hostilities, restoration of diplomatic relations, repatriation of war criminals 
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pan’s entry into the United Nations Organization, leaving various other pending problems, 
including “remaining territorial issues”， as due to be resolved after the conclusion of a 
“provisional agreement”．65
Speculating about the linkage between the Japanese-Soviet territorial disputes and the 
U.S. military presence in Japan, the “Political Course Regarding Restoration of the Japa-
nese-Soviet Diplomatic Relations” fell short of forcing both issues to collide head-on with 
one another. The latter was attempted in August of the same year in a document entitled 
“On the Current Stage of the Japanese-Soviet Negotiations.”66 
Issued on 29 August 1956, this document offered the JSP’s analysis of a crisis which be-
gan to evolve soon after the bilateral normalization talks started for the third time. In the 
middle of August, the then Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, “was ordered 
to break off talks” held in Moscow.67 Contributing his share to the breakdown of negotia-
tions, on 19 August 1956 the then U.S. Secretary of the State, John Foster Dulles, told Shi-
gemitsu during their brief encounter in London that “if Japan formally recognized Soviet 
title to the South Kuriles in a peace treaty, the United States would annex Okinawa.”68 
As if responding to the Dulles’ warning, the JSP’ s document entitled “On the Current 
Stage of the Japanese-Soviet Negotiations”， declared that an abrogation of both the SFPT 
and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty remained a “nationwide demand of the Japanese peo-
ple” and, implying the JSP’s will to abrogate both, that when the JSP’s consistent demands 
for a foreign policy line of “autonomous independence” were realized it would become pos-
sible to plan a fundamental resolution of the Japanese-Soviet Japanese territorial disputes.69
At the same time, the document leveled severe criticism at the LDP government’s poli-
cy of “being totally committed to America” and denouncing “all the communist coun-
tries”．Referring to Japan as the country where the U.S. military bases were welcome 
anywhere, the document, while being critical of the Soviet Union’s clinging to an “old prod-
65　Ibid.
66　Ibid. ［日ソ交渉の現段階について］
67　For a brief description of the crisis see Hellman, Donald C. 1969. The Peace Agreement 
with the Soviet Union. University of California Press, pp.37-39.
68　See Rees, David. 1985. The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles. Praeger Publ., p.116.
69　Nihon Shakaito Yonjyunen, p.331.
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uct” of disposing of territories on the basis of “bargains” struck between the great pow-
ers, condemned primarily the LDP government’s foreign policy for having invited such a 
Soviet Union’s response. Consequently, the document viewed the LDP’s policy line to be 
the cause of grave concern, particularly concerning a resolution of the Japanese-Soviet ter-
ritorial issues.70
The JSP’s early linkages regarding the Soviet-Japanese territorial issues and the U.S. 
military presence in Japan, while as a rule implying a possibility to resolve the former 
through a prior liquidation of the latter, included the reverse sequence as well. Thus, 
speaking at the plenary session of the National Diet’s Lower House on 27 November, 1956, 
and expressing the JSP’s willingness to support ratification of the Soviet-Japanese Joint 
Declaration, the JSP deputy, Matsumoto Shichiro, emphasized that one of the essential 
merits of the Japanese-Soviet normalization rested with its being a “turning point” in the 
direction towards the establishment of Japan’s full independence and “autonomous foreign 
policy”．71
In that regard, Matsumoto accused the LDP government, and specifically the then 
Prime Minister, Hatoyama Ichiro, of assuming a passive attitude towards the international 
situation. Providing an example, Matsumoto mentioned that Prime Minister Hatoyama in 
his replies to queries of deputies frequently stated that both the signing of a peace treaty 
and a resolution of territorial issues could be achieved when international situation 
“changed for the better.”72
A close examination of the Diet hearings which preceded ratification of the 1956 Joint 
Declaration testify to the fact that Matsumoto’s references to such statements by Hatoya-
ma were well-grounded. Thus, one of the most typical statements as it was, on 22 Novem-
ber 1956, Hatoyama, while answering deputies’ queries at the meeting of the ‘Special 
Committee on the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration’ asserted as follows :
As you all know, the ［resolution］ of the status of Etorofu ［and］ Kunashiri is deferred 
until the period of the signing of a peace treaty. As for the Habomais ［and］ Shikotan, it 
70　Ibid.
71　Kanpo Gogai （Official Gazette）．Special Edition. Japanese National Diet 25th Diet Session 
Lower House Proceedings. No. 7, Nov. 27, 1956, p.11.
72　Ibid.
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has also been settled that the Soviet Union will acknowledge their belonging to Japan 
when the peace treaty is signed. Concerning the period of the signing of a peace treaty as 
well as the time when at last the belonging issue of Etorofu ［and］ Kunashiri ［to Japan］ 
might be settled, I tend to think that the Soviet Union’s will may only change following 
shifts in the international situation. By ［referring to］ the international situation I imply 
that when there occurs an easing of tension between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, then 
there will be an opportunity. Today, all the people think that if the international tension 
eases, and a highway to peace opens wide, then the Soviet Union might stop clinging to 
［retaining］ Etorofu ［and］ Kunashiri.73 
It was this particular approach that Matsumoto Shichiro, the JSP deputy, chose to criti-
cize as passive, indicating that Hatoyama “had never dropped a word” about a decisive 
role that Japan had to play or a specific policy it had to adopt striving to improve the in-
ternational situation.74
Proceeding further to form a linkage, Matsumoto, while stressing that normalization of 
the Japanese-Soviet relations was a “starting point” leading towards “reaching a full inde-
pendence”， suggested that time was ripe for an abrogation of both the SFPT and the U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty as well as for the withdrawal of the U.S. military bases from Ja-
pan.75
In the wake of the signing of the Joint Declaration of 1956, the Soviet Union and the JSP 
established close contacts, beginning from an official visit to Moscow of the JSP delegation 
in October 1957. The Joint Statement signed on that occasion by the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union （CPSU） and the JSP on 11 October 1956, while abstaining from any ref-
erences to the bilateral territorial issues, confirmed that a normalization of the Japanese-
Soviet relations generated an opportunity to develop extensive cooperation in the spheres 
of economy, science, and culture.76
73　Nisso Kyodo Sengen Tokubetsu Iinkai Roku （Proceedings of the Special Committee on the 
Japanese-Soviet Declaration）．No. 5, Japanese National Diet 25th Diet Session Lower House 
Proceedings. No. 7, Nov. 22, 1956, p.3.
74　Kanpo Gogai （Official Gazette）．Special Edition. Japanese National Diet 25th Diet Session 
Lower House Proceedings. No. 7, Nov. 27, 1956, p.11.
75　Ibid.
76　See full text of the Joint Statement in Nisso Mondai Kankei Shiryoushu （Materials on the 
Japanese-Soviet Issues）．Nihon Shakaito Nisso Mondai Tokubetsu Iinkai  （JSP Special 
Committee on Japanese-Soviet Issues）．Tokyo, 1978, p.33.
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Ivan Kovalenko, formerly the CPSU International Department’s chief executive respon-
sible for the Soviet-Japanese relations, in his memoirs recalls that ever since the first offi-
cial contact between the CPSU and the JSP occurred in October 1957, the two parties’ re-
lationship grew stronger, gradually spreading over a large variety of areas despite 
differences in terms of political convictions.77
Results of the 28th general election to the National Diet’s Lower House （House of Rep-
resentatives） held on 22 May 1958, amply testify to the fact that policies the JSP proposed, 
including the party’s approach to territorial issues, were readily accepted by the public at 
large. Specifically, the JSP gained as much as 32. 9 percent of votes, receiving support 
from 13, 093. 993 voters.78 Drawing a comparison with the 27th general Election held on 27 
February 1955, when Socialists were divided into the Left Socialist Party and the Right 
Socialist Party, in May 1958 we observe a substantially strengthened public support, with 
l, 920. 000 additional votes gained.79 
For their part, the LDP, gaining the largest number of votes, won support from 22, 976, 
846 voters or 57. 8 percent of votes in toto, during the 28th general election.80 Thus, as a 
result of the May 1958 general election, the LDP and the JSP appeared on Japanese politi-
cal scene as two major rivals, in effect splitting the society into two opposed halves.81
A major change in the JSP’s approach to the Japanese-Soviet territorial disputes oc-
curred in October 1961 when on 8 October the JSP Central Executive Committee issued a 
document entitled “Policy Course in Regard to the Resolution of Territorial Issues” which 
addressed both the “reversion” of Okinawa and the Ogasawaras, and the “return” of the 
‘Northern Territories’, firmly linking the territorial disputes with the Soviet Union with 
77　Kovalenko, Ivan. 1996. Tainichi Kosaku-no Kaiso . ［Recalling Japan Strategies］ Tokyo: 
Bungei Shushu, p.212. Kovalenko’s memoirs were issued only in Japanese. 
78　Tsuge, Masao. 1977. Kokusei Senkyo-to Seito Seiji. ［National Elections and Party Politics］ 
Tokyo’: Seiji Koho Senta, p.53.
79　Ibid, p.45. As a result of the 27th General Election （1955） the Left Socialist Party and the 
Right Socialist Party gained in toto 29.2 percent of votes. Ibid.
80　Ibid, p.53. As a result of the 27th General Election （1955） the Liberal Party and the 
Democratic Party, predecessors of the LDP, gained in toto 63.2 percent of votes. Ibid.
81　As a result of the 28th General Election the LDP gained 287 deputy seats in the Diet 
Lower House, while the JSP won 166 seats. The remaining 14 seats were shared by the JCP 
（1）， minor parties （1） and independents （12）．The Diet, Elections, and Political Parties. 
“About Japan Series 13”．1995. Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, p.145.
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the U.S.-Japan Security treaty issue. The document sought to work out a cure for the situ-
ation featuring the “yet not realized reversion” of neither the ‘Northern’ nor the ‘South-
ern’ territories and break a deadlock of the “not as yet concluded” peace treaties with 
China and the Soviet Union.82
The document claimed that what had caused such a state of affairs along with the resul-
tant continuous instability of Japan’s position in the world was the “U.S.—Japan Security 
Treaty system”．Since, according to the document, there were no prospects for the “re-
turn” to Japan of either Okinawa and the Ogasawaras or the “Chishima Islands” as long 
as the Security Treaty existed, in order to resolve Japan’s territorial issues there was 
nothing else left to do but to abolish the “treaty system”．83
Blaming the LDP government, the JSP Central Executive Committee warned that it 
was utterly unrealistic to think that the Soviet Union was going to make concessions as 
long as Japan’s military standing continued to strengthen under conditions of the existence 
of the Security Treaty. According to the document, the LDP government’s policy could 
only “limitlessly” delay the “reversion” of both the ‘Southern’ and the ‘Northern’ territo-
ries.84
The document had also asserted that the LDP government was “clinging” to the “irre-
sponsible” policy line of “scattering” illusions among the Japanese people regarding a pos-
sibility of the “return” of Kunashiri and Etorofu. The JSP claimed that such a policy “cast 
a gloomy shadow” not only over the “return” of the Habomais and Shikotan but also over 
such “pending bilateral issues” as the Japanese-Soviet economic exchange and safe fishing 
in the “Northern waters.”85
The JSP Central Executive Committee had formulated four basic positions as they ap-
plied to the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet peace treaty and the “return” of ‘Northern 
Territories.’ The first position spelled out that Kunashiri, Etorofu and the islands located 
to the south of them （the Habomais and Shikotan） had to belong to Japan. As regards Ku-
nashiri and Etorofu, the document claimed that both islands were recognized as the Japa-
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nese territory by provisions of a bilateral agreement signed in 1855. As regards the “Ch-
ishimas lying to the north of Uruppu inclusive,” it was indicated that Japan had 
appropriated those islands as a result of territorial exchanges based on provisions of the 
Russo-Japanese agreement concluded in 1875.
Claiming also that neither of the above mentioned two groups of islands had been ap-
propriated “by violence”， the document concluded that together they made up Japan’s 
“inherent territories.” It was also mentioned separately that the Yalta agreement was not 
binding on Japan.86
The second position was specifically directed against policies of the LDP government. 
Firstly, calling it a major blunder, the document accused the “reactionary” LDP govern-
ment of renouncing rights to these islands despite the background described in the first 
position. Secondly, implying formerly Prime Minister Ikeda’s statement of October 3, the 
JSP accused the LDP government of changing its previous position concerning a definition 
of Kunashiri and Etorofu. Thirdly, the document pointed out that the government’s insis-
tent claim that the “Chishima islands” had not been renounced in favor of the Soviet 
Union was an argument “unacceptable internationally.”87
The document’s third position asserted that it was “absolutely impossible” to secure the 
“return” of the ‘Chishima Islands’ under conditions of the LDP’s continuous policy of 
strengthening the “Security Treaty system.”88
The fourth position put forward by the JSP Central Executive Committee manifested a 
“two stages approach” to the resolution of the territorial issue. Specifically, the document 
offered as “the only realistic means” to secure stability of the Japanese-Soviet relations 
and contribute to the easing of international tension in the Far East, striving - as “the 
first stage measure’ - to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union conditional on the 
“return” to Japan of the Habomais and Shikotan.89
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carrying on negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the “return” of Japan’s “inherent 
territories of the Chishimas” simultaneously with striving for the abolition of the “Security 
Treaty System”．90
According to Uezumi Mutsuhiro, the policy shift embodied in the JSP Central Executive 
Committee’s document issued in October 1951 was based on the initiative of the then head 
of the JSP International Department, Wada Hiroo, two members of the Central Executive 
Committee in charge of national movement, Katsumata Seiichi and Kameda Tokuji, Secre-
tary of the National Movement Bureau, Ito Shigeru, and Head of the National Movement 
Bureau, Hososako Kanemitsu.91 The approach contained in the “Policy Course in Regard 
to the Resolution of Territorial Issues” of October 1961 was later confirmed in such pri-
mary JSP documents as the “Opinion Regarding the Northern Territories Problem” ［北方
領土問題に対する見解］， issued in November 1969 by the JSP “Special Committee on Poli-
cies Regarding the Japanese-Soviet issues” and yet another document, entitled “Opinion 
Regarding the Northern Territories Problem” issued by the same Committee on 24 
March, 1972.92
This particular approach, in the course of inter-party opposition, was instrumental in the 
formation of the LDPs lasting formulation of Japan’s territorial demands.
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